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This paper explores the existence of downward real wage rigidity (DRWR) in 19 OECD 
countries, over the period 1973–1999, using data for hourly nominal earnings at industry 
level. Based on a nonparametric statistical method, which allows for country and year specific 
variation in both the median and the dispersion of industry wage changes, we find evidence of 
some downward rigidity of real wages in OECD countries overall, as well as for regions and 
time periods. There is some evidence that real wage cuts are less prevalent under strict 
employment protection legislation and high union density. Generally, we find stronger 
evidence for downward nominal than for downward real wage rigidity. 
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Whether real wages are rigid downwards is important for the eﬀects of adverse shocks to the
economy. In early explanations of the persistent European unemployment problem, a leading idea
was that when unemployment had risen due to various types of shocks, real wages remained high,
preventing unemployment from coming down again (see e.g. Grubb et al., 1983 and Bruno and
Sachs, 1985). More recently, real wage rigidity has become a key part in several contributions
to business cycle and monetary policy literature. Danthine and Kurmann (2005), Erceg et al.
(2000) and Smets and Wouters (2003) ﬁnd that wage rigidity plays an important role when
calibrating dsge models to data. Blanchard and Gali (2005) argue that real wage rigidity is a
crucial element in understanding inﬂation persistence, while Hall (2005) and Shimer (2005) argue
that real wage rigidity is necessary to explain the large cyclical variation in vacancies. However,
other contributions have disputed some of these conclusions, see Krause and Lubik (2006) and
Mortensen and Nagyál (2006).
The rising interest in wage rigidity increases the need for more empirical evidence on the extent
of wage rigidity in diﬀerent countries. We focus on one speciﬁc aspect of wage sluggishness, namely
whether real wages are rigid downwards. Downward real wage rigidity (drwr) will be of particular
relevance for how the economy functions in a downturn as it aﬀects how adverse shocks may lead
to unemployment rather than lower wages. Our analysis also sheds some light on whether wage
rigidity is asymmetric.
Recently, several studies including the International Wage Flexibility Project have found em-
pirical evidence for the existence of considerable drwr in a number of oecd countries, mostly
based on micro data (see Dickens et al., 2005, Barwell and Schweitzer, 2004, Bauer et al., 2004,
Christoﬁdes and Li, 2005 and Cornelissen and Hübler, 2005). In contrast to these studies, we
explore the existence of drwr at industry level, based on data from 19 oecd countries for the
period 1973–99, covering in total 449 country-year samples. More speciﬁcally, we investigate
whether there are ‘too few’ real wage cuts in the country-year speciﬁc distributions of industry
wage changes, compared to what one would expect without downward rigidity.
2The studies on micro data provide valuable evidence of wage rigidity for individual job stayers.
However, it is not clear that rigid real wages for job stayers will imply the same rigidity at more
aggregate levels. Firms may respond to individual wage rigidity by other means, as giving lower
wage growth to other workers, or by changing the composition of the work force. And even if
wage rigidity binds in some ﬁrms, wages may fall in other ﬁrms so that jobs are shifted over to
them. Consistent with this, Farès and Lemieux (2001) ﬁnd in Canadian data that most of the
real wage adjustments over the business cycle is experienced by new entrants.
If the eﬀects of drwr for individual job stayers is weakened by such mechanisms, it is not clear
what the aggregate eﬀects are. One possibility is that the individual rigidity is oﬀset entirely, in
which case one would not expect it to have important macroeconomic or allocative eﬀects. Another
possibility is that these mechanisms are unimportant, making wage rigidity more diﬃcult to detect,
but not removing the implications of it. It is diﬃcult to distinguish between these possibilities
using data for individual job stayers only. In contrast, if we detect drwr in industry data, we
know that the rigidity prevails in spite of compositional eﬀects.
An alternative to our study of industry wages would be to look directly for evidence of real wage
rigidity on aggregate times series data, followed by a study of the macroeconomic implications.
In an inﬂuential study, Layard et al. (1991) ﬁnd among other things evidence of asymmetric real
wage rigidity in a number of oecd countries, indicating resistance by workers to allowing adverse
terms-of-trade shocks to push down wages. More recently, Nickell et al. (2003) and Nunziata
(2005) ﬁnd evidence of real wage resistance, consistent with the notion that wage setters oppose a
reduction in wages relative to consumer prices. Compared to this literature, we limit the focus to
a test aimed directly at drwr, which is rarely done in times series work. Furthermore, we beneﬁt
from a panel data set across countries, years and industries, providing more information in the
data than most studies on aggregate data. In particular, the broader scope across countries and
time than other studies of wage rigidity increases our ability to explore whether wage rigidity is
aﬀected by economic and institutional variables. Overall, our study should detect other aspects
than previous studies on other types of data, and thus be complementary to these studies.
3The method we use builds on our previous work on downward nominal wage rigidity (Holden
and Wulfsberg, 2007). It is a non-parametric variant of the skewness-location approach of McLaugh-
lin (1994), using data for real hourly earnings only. The idea of our test is as follows. We construct
notional (i.e. if no rigidity exists) country-year speciﬁc distributions of wage changes, deriving the
shape of the distributions on the basis of country-year samples with high real and nominal wage
growth, where downward rigidities are less likely to bind. We condition on the empirical location
and dispersion of the country-year samples, to allow for the variation in productivity growth,
markups, and the extent of sectoral shocks that will exist in an extensive data set as the one we
use. Based on the country-year speciﬁc notional distributions, we can calculate the probability of
a real wage cut for each country year. We then simulate over all country-years, using the country-
year speciﬁc notional probabilities, and compare the number of simulated, notional real wage cuts
with the number of empirical real wage cuts. If the number of notional wage cuts is signiﬁcantly
larger than the empirical counterpart, we conclude that wages are rigid downwards. Robustness
checks in Holden and Wulfsberg (2007) indicate that the method has very good properties in
detecting the downward wage rigidity that exists in the data.
Most previous work on downward rigidity of wages has focused on nominal rigidity (see surveys
in Camba-Mendez et al., 2003, and Holden, 2004). Downward rigidity might apply to nominal
values if people care about nominal wages (as some studies indicate they do), if contracts are
in nominal terms, or if inﬂation serves as a vehicle for coordinated reduction in real wages (as
implied by Keynes’ argument for the existence of downward rigidity of nominal wages). Yet it is
real, not nominal wages, that rational agents should care about. There are also several reasons
for why we would expect real wages to be rigid downwards, cf. below. Thus it seems reasonable
also to explore the existence of drwr. Distinguishing between downward real and nominal wage
rigidity is crucial among other things for the interaction between inﬂation and wage rigidity.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In section 3 we lay out the theoretical
framework, and compare with related literature. Section 4 presents our data, and discusses the
empirical approach. Results are given in section 5 and 6, while section 7 concludes.
42 Why drwr?
The idea that wage setting is inﬂuenced by wage aspirations of the wage setters has been suggested
and discussed by many economists. As mentioned in the introduction, this idea was highly
inﬂuential as an early explanation of the persistent European unemployment (see discussion and
references in Alogoskouﬁs and Manning, 1988). It was pointed out that workers had learned
to expect a steady growth in real wages induced by the fast growth in the 1950s and 60s, and
that this would lead to greater wage pressure if productivity growth became less favourable. The
theoretical justiﬁcation for such an eﬀect was however disputed, see e.g. the sharp critique by
Phelps (1992).
Various types of eﬃciency wage or bargaining models provide a number of explanations as to
why, in a situation of high unemployment, real wages do not fall so as to clear the labour market.
However, these theories do not by themselves give a role for path dependence where wages are
rigid compared to past or aspired levels. Downward rigidity in the sense that the past wage level
have an independent eﬀect on the current wage level, in addition to the eﬀect of other factors,
requires a role of eﬀects that are usually not included in standard economic models.
More recent work has put forward two main explanations for downward rigidity of real wages.
Within the rationality assumptions usually adopted in economics, Ellingsen and Holden (1998)
and Postlewaite et al. (2004) show that real wage resistance may follow if consumption patterns
are costly to change. For example, if it is costly to sell a house and buy a cheaper one, a risk
neutral agent may become risk loving when faced with an unexpected reduction in the real wage.
Furthermore, a utilitarian union might prefer to ﬁght to uphold the real wage if an adverse shock
takes place, so as to preserve the consumption patterns for the majority of the members, even if
this implies that a minority of the workers are laid oﬀ and have to sell their house.
A second, behavioural justiﬁcation of drwr is to argue up front that agents speciﬁcally dislike
negative changes in their income. There is now a considerable experimental evidence documenting
that many individuals do display such behaviour. A number of studies have documented the
existence of loss aversion, i.e. that people are more averse to losses relative to their reference level
5than they are attracted to the same-sized gains (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Loss aversion
gives rise to the endowment eﬀect, which describes the feature that once a person possesses a good,
he values it more. Falk and Fehr (2005) show in experiments that employers abstain from accepting
bids from workers that involve undercutting of prevailing wages, in the fear that lower wages may
have an adverse eﬀect on eﬀorts. The same ﬁnding is documented in recent questionnaire and
interview studies of managers and owners of ﬁrms, see e.g. Bewley (1999) and Agell and Lundborg
(2003). Thus, there are good reasons to take seriously the possibility that real wages can be rigid
downwards.
3 drwr and the distribution of wage changes
As a framework for the empirical exercise, we formulate a simple model of ﬁrm-level wage bargain-
ing, where loss aversion with respect to past real wages is the source of drwr. The formulation
draws upon Bhaskar (1990), Driscoll and Holden (2004), and in particular McDonald and Sibly
(2001). We have chosen a union-ﬁrm framework, in part because in most oecd countries, the ma-
jority of the workers are in fact covered by collective agreements. However, the key features could
also be derived in other settings, e.g. in an eﬃciency wage framework, as long as one maintains
the crucial assumption that workers experience a utility loss if their wage falls.
Let the proﬁts of the ﬁrm be a decreasing function of the real wage w,1
π = w1−η, where η > 2. (1)
η is the elasticity of product demand. A worker in a job with a given number of hours is assumed
to have an indirect utility function which depends on the current and past real wages w and w−1
V = w1+Dµw
−Dµ
−1 , where µ ≥ 0 (2)
1This proﬁt function follows from a model of monopolistic competition where ﬁrms set the output price facing
a downward sloping demand curve, η is the elasticity of demand, labour is the only production factor, and there is
constant returns to scale. Irrelevant constants are omitted.
6and where D is a dummy variable which is equal to unity if real wages fall, i.e. if w < w−1, and
zero otherwise. As long as real wages do not fall, utility is simply linear in real wages. However,
we allow for the possibility that workers compare their current wage with their past wage (if
µ > 0), incurring an additional utility loss if the wage falls. In this case, utility is still continuous
in current and past real wages, and strictly increasing in current real wages. Yet there is a kink
in the utility function at the point where the wage is equal to its past value, implying that utility
is non-diﬀerentiable from the left (i.e. for w < w−1) at the point w = w−1. All workers are
organised in a union, and the union is assumed to represent the interests of the median worker,
who, under a layoﬀ by seniority rule is certain to keep his job. Thus (2) can also be thought of as
the payoﬀ function of the union.
We model the wage setting by use of the (symmetric) Nash Bargaining Solutionwhere the
bargaining outcome is the wage that maximises the product of the ﬁrm’s and the union’s gain
from reaching an agreement, i.e. the payoﬀs as compared to the disagreement points, π0 for the









s.t. π ≥ 0 and V ≥ V0 (3)
The disagreement point of the union, V0 > 0, will depend on variables that inﬂuence workers’
payoﬀ if the bargainers fail to reach an agreement, e.g.the rate of unemployment, unemployment
beneﬁts and outside wages. As shown in appendix A, the solution to (3) is given as follows.
w =

      







1+µ if V0 < V L
0 ,




η−2V0 if V0 > V H
0 .
(4)
2We neglect that if the bargaining outcome is aﬀected by past wages, rational agents should take the eﬀect
on future bargaining outcomes into consideration during the negotiations. The risk that drwr may bind in the
future, pushing wages up, will lead wage setters to choose a lower wage today, see Holden (1997) and Elsby (2004).
However, this will not prevent the eﬀect of drwr that binds, which is what we look for in the empirical analysis.








η−1w−1 > V L
0
As in a standard model without a kink in utility function (e.g. Layard et al., 1991), the wage is
a markup over the workers’ disagreement point, where the markup depends on the elasticity of
product demand η. However, due to the non-diﬀerentiability, the outcome also depends on the
past wage. If workers are in a weak position due to a low disagreement point, V0 < V L
0 , their real
wage will be cut. Yet their resistance towards accepting a cut in their real wage will imply that
they get a higher real wage than they would have got if their past real wage had been lower. In
Figure 1, this is illustrated by the solid line – the bargaining outcome – coinciding with the upper
dashed curve. If workers are in a strong position, V0 > V H
0 , they will get a real wage increase.
Yet as they do not have to resist a wage cut, they ﬁght less for higher wages. Thus, the outcome
indicated by the solid line in Figure 1 coincides with the lower dashed line. For medium levels
of the disagreement point, the real wage remains constant, as the workers are not able to push
wages up, nor is the ﬁrm able to push wages down.
The histogram in Figure 2 provides a graphical illustration of the wage change distribution
from the bargaining model (4). There are many symmetric ﬁrms, and the workers’ disagreement
point is treated as a random variable with normal distribution. We also add an error term to
the wage change, to capture among other things the eﬀect of inﬂation surprises, in view of the
fact that wages usually are set on annual basis, and in nominal terms, with none or partial price
indexation. The solid line in Figure 2 represents the wage change distribution in the absence of
rigidities (µ = 0), in the literature denoted the notional wage change distribution (Akerlof et al.,
1996). We observe that there is a deﬁcit of negative real wage changes in the histogram compared
to the the notional. The parameters of the model are chosen so that 40 percent of the notional
real wage changes are negative (see the ﬁgure caption for parameter values). Of these potential
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Figure 2: A notional distribution of real wage
changes (solid line) and a histogram of a distribu-
tion of real wage changes. (η = 3,µ = 0.1, V0 ∼
N(−0.62,0.35),V L
0 ≈ V P30,V H
0 ≈ V P40
0 and ε ∼
N(0,0.01).)
wage cuts, 15 percent are prevented by drwr (because µ = 0.1), implying that the rigid wage
change distribution is skewed to the right.
Note that the model implies that the deﬁcit of wage cuts depends on the size of the cut. Of
notional wage changes below –2 percent, 31 percent are prevented by drwr, and this percentage
increases to 33 for notional wage changes below –5 percent. The intuition behind this feature,
that the percentage reduction in the number of small wage cuts is lower, is that while small wage
cuts are prevented by drwr, the larger wage cuts are reduced to smaller cuts by the drwr. In
our case the latter eﬀect dominates the former so that the net eﬀect is in fact a surplus of small
wage cuts between –2 and 0 percent compared to the notional.
The theoretical model allows us to make a point on how drwr relates to the literature which is
concerned with the weak response of real wages to unemployment. As pointed out by Alogoskouﬁs
and Manning (1988), one can decompose this weakness into two conceptually diﬀerent mechanisms:
(i) a small direct eﬀect of unemployment on real wages, and (ii) a sluggish adjustment of real wages.
In our model, the latter eﬀect is represented by a positive partial eﬀect of past wages, i.e. µ > 0
which is what we look for in the empirical exercises below. The ﬁrst eﬀect corresponds to a small
9partial derivative ∂V0/∂U, (where U is unemployment) which would lead to a reduced dispersion
of the distribution of wage changes. This reduced dispersion would, however, not depend on the
location of the distribution, i.e. on whether the real wage change is positive or negative.
3.1 Eﬀects of aggregation, compositional changes, spillover and expectations
In contrast to recent micro studies on drwr, which typically explore the change in hourly earnings
of individual job stayers, the observational unit in our data is the change in the average hourly
earnings for all manual workers in the industry. There are two key diﬀerences. First, our data
entails averaging over all job stayers. Second, they are aﬀected by compositional changes, i.e.
that the wages of new workers diﬀer from the wages of those who leave (see formal framework in
appendix B).
Concerning the wage increase for job stayers, averaging over many workers may mask wage cuts
for single workers if other workers receive wage increases. This will tend to reduce the incidence of
real wage cuts (given that the economy-wide wage change is positive), as the average wage change
has a lower variance than individual wage changes.
As for compositional changes, one may expect to ﬁnd both systematic and random eﬀects.
There will be a systematic negative eﬀect as older workers who leave the labour force on average
have higher wages than younger, newcomers to the labour market. This will increase the number
of wage cuts. Second, one may expect cyclical eﬀects, as the share of low-skilled workers may
increase in expansions, cf. Solon et al. (1994). This latter compositional eﬀect is likely to dampen
ﬂuctuations in wage growth, thus reducing the number of wage cuts, as in recessions, when wage
growth for job stayers is likely to be low, the increased share of high-skilled workers will imply
a positive compositional eﬀect. Overall, the eﬀect of systematic compositional changes on the
number of wage cuts is ambiguous. In contrast, the random element arising from unsystematic
turnover may be considered as ‘noise’ relative to individual wage rigidity. The noise eﬀect will
imply that we ﬁnd less drwr.
In addition to the aggregation and composition eﬀects discussed above, we must take into
10account that drwr for some workers have implications for the wages of other workers in the
industry. One such eﬀect would be if ﬁrms respond to downward rigidity at the individual level
by e.g. giving lower wage increases to other workers, or by changing the composition of the
workforce. Workers whose wage is cut may quit, and the replacements may accept the lower wage.
Furthermore, binding wage rigidity in some ﬁrms may raise industry unemployment, pushing down
wages in other ﬁrms. If these other ﬁrms respond by increasing their hiring, it may oﬀset the
eﬀects on industry employment. Thus, it seems important also to explore the extent of drwr at
the industry level.
In practice, wage setting is based on wage setters’ expected rate of inﬂation. This implies that
wage setters whose expected rate of inﬂation is below the actual rate of inﬂation, may end up
with a negative real wage change even if binding drwr pushes the expected real wage change up
to zero. However, in our main approach, we try to detect the amount of downward wage rigidity
that is present in actual real wages, irrespective of whether the ﬂexibility is caused by ﬂexible
wage setting, compositional eﬀects or expectational errors. Thus we deﬂate by the actual rate of
inﬂation. Yet as a sensitivity test, we also try our approach using estimates of expected inﬂation.
Most of the previous literature on drwr focusses on the existence of drwr at zero, i.e.
constant real wages. However, the upshot of the theoretical model and discussion above is that in
our case it is not obvious that we should focus exclusively on zero. First, the stylised theoretical
model shows that drwr may push up the real wage change, even in the case where the real wage
change is negative, implying that the deﬁcit of wage cuts compared to the notional distribution is
greater for rates below zero. Second, compositional and other eﬀects mentioned above may lead
to downward rigidities at diﬀerent levels than zero, even if the rigidity is at zero for individual
employees. Third, if drwr binds for wage setters with expected rate of inﬂation that is, say, one
percent below the actual rate of inﬂation, the real wage change is pushed up to minus one percent.
Thus, in addition to real wage rigidity at zero (preventing real wage cuts), we consider rigidity
at –2 and –5 percent (i.e. ∆w < −2 and ∆w < −5). For comparison, we also consider nominal
wage rigidity, i.e. if ∆w + π < 0 where π is the inﬂation rate.
11Overall, our study is complementary to previous studies on micro data. On the one hand,
aggregation and compositional eﬀects will weaken our ability to detect drwr, most likely implying
that we will detect less drwr than micro studies. On the other hand, if we do ﬁnd drwr in our
data, this would imply that drwr at the individual level is not oﬀset by wage ﬂexibility for other
workers in the industry, making it more likely that the drwr also aﬀects aggregate variables.
4 Empirical approach
We use an unbalanced panel of industry level data for the annual percentage growth of gross
hourly earnings for manual workers from the manufacturing, mining and quarrying, electricity,
gas and water supply, and construction sectors of 19 oecd countries in the period 1973–1999.
The countries included in the sample are Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Denmark, Spain,
Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Portu-
gal, Sweden, the uk and the us. The main data source for wages are harmonised hourly earnings
from Eurostat and wages in manufacturing from ilo, measured in a reference period which is
typically October or the last quarter of the year.3 To measure real wages we deﬂate the nominal
wage with the average consumer price index over the year. Thus, we look for rigidity of consumer
real wages, not producer real wages, as our theoretical motivation for drwr is from workers’
preferences, which relate to consumer real wages. One observation of real wage growth is denoted
∆wjit where j is index for industry, i is index for country and t is index for year. There are all
together 9509 observations distributed across 449 country-year samples, on average 21 industries
per country-year.
In our data we observe no less than Y = 3092 events of real wage cuts, i.e. 32.5 percent of all
observations. And only 72 (16 percent) of the 449 country-year samples are without any real wage
cuts. Table C1 in the data appendix reports the distribution of real wage cuts and observations
across countries and years. More details on the data are provided in appendix C.
3The data for Austria, Canada, Finland, New Zealand, Sweden and the us are from the ilo, while the data for
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Figure 3: Histogram of real wage growth in Austria, 1988.
To explore the existence of drwr, we extend the method that we use to detect downward
nominal wage rigidity in Holden and Wulfsberg (2007). To understand the basic idea of the
method, consider the distribution of the real wage changes for 16 industries in Austria 1988 in
Figure 3. In this histogram, there are evidently fewer negative real wage changes than in a
hypothetical notional distribution as in Figure 2. However, there are two problems with this kind
of ‘eyeball econometrics’. First, we don’t know how the the notional distribution looks like as it is
not observed. Second, even if we knew the notional distribution, we need a statistical method to
infer whether a deﬁcit of real wage cuts constitutes a signiﬁcant discrepancy between the empirical
and the notional distribution.
We approach these problems by constructing the notional wage change distributions on the
basis of country-year samples with high median nominal and real wage growth (details are out-
lined below), on the presumption that these samples are much less aﬀected by any downward
rigidities. Comparing country-year empirical histograms of wage growth, reveal not surprisingly,
that the location of the distribution varies considerably between countries and over time, pre-
sumably depending on variables like inﬂation and aggregate productivity growth. The dispersion
of the distribution also varies considerably across countries and time, depending on the size and
dispersion of industry speciﬁc shocks in that country-year. Thus, it seems imperative to allow for
13cross country variation in location and dispersion also of the notional distributions. To do this,
we construct country-year speciﬁc notional distributions by adjusting the underlying distribution
with the empirical country-year speciﬁc median and inter percentile range.
Earlier studies have typically used methods like the lsw statistic (Lebow et al., 2003) or
the Kahn test (Kahn, 1997) which involve more restrictive assumptions than our, see discussion
in Nickell and Quintini (2003) and Holden and Wulfsberg (2007). The Nickell-Quintini method
(Nickell and Quintini, 2003) allows for variation in dispersion across years, but it involves the
approximation that the density function is linear over the range relevant for wage rigidity; an
assumption that does not hold in our case. Recently, Christoﬁdes and Nearchou (2006) have
suggested an extension of the Kahn method with much less restrictive assumptions. Overall, by
allowing for country-year speciﬁc variation in location and dispersion, we allow for more variation
than most other methods that are used in the literature.
4.1 Constructing the notional distribution
Speciﬁcally, we construct an underlying distribution based on a subset H of the sample, with
SH = 1331 observations from the 66 country-year samples where both the median nominal and
the median real wage growth are among their respective upper quartiles.4 To mitigate any eﬀect
of dnwr and outliers, we follow Nickell and Quintini (2003) and measure the location by the
median, and the dispersion by the range between the 75th and the 35th percentiles, rather than
the mean and the standard deviation. The underlying distribution of wage changes is then con-
structed by use of the 66 samples with high median nominal and real wage growth, by subtracting
the corresponding country-year speciﬁc median (µit) and dividing by the inter percentile range







, ∀ j,i,t ∈ H and s = 1,...,SH (6)
4Thus, in these country-year samples, the median nominal wage growth is above the 3rd quartile of 11.8 percent,
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Figure 4: Left: Histogram and kernel density (solid line) of the normalised underlying distribution of
wage changes compared to the normal density (dotted line). 14 extreme observations are omitted. Right:
Histogram of observed real wage changes and the notional real wage change distribution (solid line) in
Austria, 1988.
where subscript s runs over all j, i and t in the 66 country-year samples. The left panel of Figure
4 compares the underlying notional distribution of wage changes (illustrated by the histogram
and the kernel density in solid line) with the standard normal distribution (dotted line); we notice
that the underlying distribution is asymmetric as it slightly skewed right.5
Then, for each of the 449 country-years in the overall sample, we construct notional country-
year speciﬁc distributions of wage changes by adjusting the underlying wage change distribution







+ µit, ∀ i,t, and s = 1,...,SH (7)
Thus, we have then constructed 449 notional country-year distributions, each consisting of SH =
1331 wage change ‘observations’. In the right panel of Figure 4 we have plotted notional dis-
tribution for Austria in 1988 together with the empirical histogram. The notional country-year
distributions have by construction the same median and interpercentile range as their empirical
country-year counterparts, whereas the shape is common for all notional country-year samples,
5The coeﬃcient of skewness is 0.26.
15given by the shape of the underlying notional distribution.
To explore the validity of the assumption of a common shape of all the notional distribu-
tions, we have undertaken Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of equality between the common underlying
distribution against one alternative where the underlying distribution is constructed separately
for each country, and one where it is constructed separately for each of the four time periods.
The assumption of a common underlying distribution passes easily in all 19 + 27 = 46 tests with
the lowest p-value of 0.211. However, we also try a large number of alternatives to explore the
sensitivity of the assumptions, cf. discussion below.
Given the notional country-year speciﬁc distributions, we can explore the extent of drwr at
diﬀerent thresholds by comparing the lower tails of the notional and the empirical distributions.
The point estimate of the extent of drwr follows directly from comparing the incidence of wage
cuts in the empirical and the notional distributions at zero, –2 and –5 percent. In order to
investigate drwr at zero percent, we calculate the empirical incidence for each country-year




, ∀ j (8)
where #∆wjit < 0 is the number of real wage cuts and Sit is the number of observations in
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For country-years where there is at least one notional real wage cut, implying that ˜ qit > 0, we
can calculate an often used measure of drwr, which is the fraction of real wage cuts prevented,
fwcp deﬁned as
FWCPit = 1 − qit/˜ qit (10)
If, for example, the incidence of wage cuts in the empirical sample is half of that in the notional
distribution, then FWCP = 0.5, while fwcp is negative if the empirical incidence rate is larger
than the notional.
16For example, in Austria 1988 the incidence rate of notional real wage cuts, ˜ qit, is 11 percent
while the empirical incidence rate, qit is 6 percent (one real wage cut out of 16 observations).
The diﬀerence in incidence rates implies that the fwcp was 0.5, providing suggestive evidence for
drwr in in Austria 1988.
There is a lot of variation in the incidence rates (and thus the fwcp’s) across the country-
year samples. In order to look for interesting patterns in these estimates across countries, we
will calculate aggregate incidence rates and the fwcp for countries, periods as well as the overall
sample (i.e. all country-years). We aggregate the country-year estimates by pooling the empirical
observations in the relevant sample (eg all country-years) implying that the country-year notional
incidence rates are weighted according to the number of observations within the country-year.
For the overall sample, the fraction of wage cuts prevented at zero percent is FWCP = 1−q/˜ q =
1−0.325/0.337 = 0.037. Thus, only about four out of one hundred notional real wage cuts in the
overall sample do not result in an observed wage cut due to dnwr. To investigate drwr at –2
and –5 percent we compute the incidence rates and fwcp accordingly. For the whole sample the
fraction of notional real wage changes below the –2 percent level that are prevented by drwr is
0.113 and at – 5 percent the fwcp is 0.184, i.e. both are considerably higher than the fwcp at
zero percent.
The ﬁnding of higher fwcp for negative rates of change is consistent with the feature of the
theoretical model in section 3 above that drwr is pushing up real wages even when the real
wage change is negative. Interestingly, a calibrated version of the theoretical model provides a
remarkably close approximation to the overall empirical results. Choosing two parameter values,
η = 3, µ = 0.033 and drawing V0 from the normalised underlying distribution as given by (6)
(instead of a normal distribution), we obtain fwcp of 0.037, 0.126 and 0.162 at 0, –2 and –5
percent respectively. This close ﬁt strengthens the interpretation from the theoretical model that
the higher fwcp for negative rates of change, –2 and –5, is caused by drwr pushing up real wages
even when the real wage change is negative. However, one cannot rule out other explanations, cf.
further discussion below.
17To test whether our estimates of the fwcp are statistically signiﬁcant, we exploit that the
incidence rate in the notional wage change distribution can be viewed as the probability of a wage
cut if there was no drwr. In other words, under the Null hypothesis of no drwr, the number
of wage cuts in country-year it with, say, 20 industries, is given by 20 independent draws from
the binomial distribution with probability ˜ qit. For samples covering more than one country-year,
the number of wage cuts under the Null hypothesis of no dnwr, is given by the combination
of several binomial distributions, with respective incidence rates ˜ qit as probabilities. Calculating
this by use of the appropriate formulaes is, however, computationally extremely demanding, thus
we compute the p-values for the number of wage cuts in the empirical samples on the basis of
simulations. This is computationally much simpler, and still highly accurate.
Speciﬁcally, our simulation method goes as follows. For each country-year it, we draw Sit times
(i.e. the number of industries in country-year it) from a binomial distribution with probability
˜ qit. We then add up all the simulated real wage cuts for the relevant country-years, e.g. for all
country-years (  Y ), and compare with the total number of wage cuts in the corresponding empirical
distribution, e.g. Y = 3211. We then repeat this procedure 5000 times, and count the number
of times where we simulate more notional wage cuts than we observe, for the overall sample
denoted #(  Y > Y ). The Null hypothesis is rejected with a level of signiﬁcance at 5 percent if
1−#(  Y > Y )/5000 ≤ 0.05. We can also use the simulation results to obtain conﬁdence intervals
for our estimate of dnwr.
Note that if drwr binds in some country-year samples that are used in constructing the
underlying wage change distribution, the underlying wage change distribution will be compressed.
Likewise, if drwr aﬀects our measure of the dispersion in certain country-year samples, the
associated notional country-year speciﬁc distribution will also be compressed. Thus, in these
cases the notional probabilities will be biased downwards, reducing the number of simulated wage
cuts. This will reduce the power of our test. However, if there is no drwr, there will be no
downward bias, so it will not aﬀect the signiﬁcance level of our test.
185 Results
Table 1 displays the main results. From the ﬁrst result columns, we note that in the overall
sample, there is highly signiﬁcant drwr at zero (i.e. constant real wages), but as noted above the
fwcp is only 3.7 percent. Distinguishing between time periods, the downward rigidity appears
stronger in the 1970s and late 1990s, with fwcp of 6–7 percent, than in the 1980s and early 1990s.
Table 1 also reports the fwcp across geographical regions; Anglo (Canada, Ireland, New
Zealand, the uk and the us), Core (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the
Netherlands), Nordic (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden) and South (Italy, Greece, Portugal
and Spain). The classiﬁcation is largely based on geography and language, but typically, countries
in the same region are fairly similar when it comes to labour market institutions. Generally, there
is a tendency of high unionisation and fairly strict employment protection legislation (epl) in the
Nordic countries, moderate unionisation and stricter epl in the South, moderate unionisation and
moderate epl in the Core, and lower unionisation and weaker epl in the Anglo countries. While
the point estimates indicate some drwr for all regions, this is only signiﬁcant for the Anglo and
Core regions.
The subsequent columns show that wages are more rigid at lower growth rates than zero,
with fwcp for the overall sample of 11.3 percent at –2, and 18.4 percent at –5. At –2, drwr is
signiﬁcant for all time periods. The fwcp is highest in the 1970s (16.2 percent). drwr is highest
in the Core region (18.8 percent) and around 11 percent in the Anglo and Nordic countries. The
fwcp is signiﬁcant in all regions except the South. At –5, the estimated fwcp is above 30 percent
both in the Core and in the Nordic regions, while in the South, the fwcp is only 9 percent, with
a p-value of 6 percent.
As noted above, the larger estimated fwcp at negative growth rates than at zero is consistent
with the theoretical model in section 3, where drwr pushes up negative wage changes, reducing
the number of large wage cuts, but also increasing the number of small wage cuts. However, more
prevalent downward rigidity at –2 and –5 might also be caused by rigidity at zero for individuals
and possibly also ﬁrms, combined with some downward ﬂexibility due to compositional changes.
19Table 1: The fraction of real wage cuts prevented (FWCP) estimated at 0, –2 and –5 percent and the
fraction of nominal wage cuts prevented. p-values in parenthesis.
Evaluation criteria
#∆w < 0 #∆w < −0.02 #∆w < −0.05 #(∆w + π) < 0
Category S Y FWCP Y FWCP Y FWCP Y FWCP










































































Note: S is the number of observations, Y is the number of observed wage cuts below the relevant limit
Furthermore, it may reﬂect that some wage setters have inﬂation expectations below the actual
rate of inﬂation.
For comparison, the last columns report the result on downward nominal wage rigidity, dnwr.
We observe that the fwcps are almost always higher for nominal than for real rigidity, the only
exception being the Core region, where there is high real rigidity at the –5 level. The most notable
diﬀerence is for the South, where the fwcp applying to nominal rigidity is more than 40 percent,
and thus four times as high as the corresponding measure for real rigidity at –5 percent. When
we combine time periods and regions we ﬁnd that drwr at –2 and –5 percent is prevalent in the
Anglo, Core and Nordic regions in the 1970s and 80s, see Table D1 in the appendix. In contrast,
in the South, there is never signiﬁcant drwr, even if the point estimates for the fwcp at –2 and
–5 are small and positive in most time periods.
20Table 2: The fraction of real wage cuts prevented (FWCP) estimated at 0, –2 and –5 percent and the
fraction of nominal wage cuts prevented.
Evaluation criteria
#∆w < 0 #∆w < −0.02 #∆w < −0.05 #(∆w + π) < 0
Country S Y FWCP Y FWCP Y FWCP Y FWCP
























































































































































Note: See Table 1
Table 2 shows the results for individual countries. At the –2 level, drwr is signiﬁcant with
a fwcp around 0.5 in Austria and Finland, and also signiﬁcant with lower fwcp in 9 additional
countries (Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Sweden, the UK
and the US), while there is no indication of drwr in 8 countries (Canada, Denmark, France,
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Figure 5: dnwr and drwr by country.
drwr at –2 percent. There is a clear positive correlation, the outliers being Italy and Portugal
where dnwr is much stronger.
As an exploration of the robustness of our results, we have varied the key assumptions con-
cerning the shape, the location and the dispersion of the notional distributions. As to the shape
of the underlying distribution, we have tried country-speciﬁc and period-speciﬁc distributions in
addition to the common shape assumption. While there is considerable variation in the results
from diﬀerent methods, the broad picture remains the same; the details and results from the
robustness tests are reported in the appendix E.
Based on data for individual job stayers, Dickens et al. (2005) ﬁnd drwr at the zero level
with fwcp ranging from around 5 percent in Greece and the us to around 50 percent in France,
Finland and Sweden, with most countries in the range 15–35 percent. Compared to these results,
our estimated fwcp are much smaller, in particular at the zero level, but also at –2 and –5 percent.
Our lower estimates is as should be expected due to the existence of compositional eﬀects and the
scope for ﬁrms circumventing wage rigidity at the individual level. Note also that the measure of
drwr in Dickens et al. (2005) is based on individual real wages, thus it will be strongly aﬀected
by the wage change distribution within ﬁrms and industries, in contrast to our measure based on
industry averages.
22Table 3: The fraction of industry-years aﬀected (FIYA) estimated at 0, –2 and –5 percent and the fraction
of nominal wage cuts prevented. p-values in parenthesis.
Evaluation criteria
#∆w < 0 #∆w < −0.02 #∆w < −0.05 #(∆w − π) < 0
Category S Y FIYA Y FIYA Y FIYA Y FIYA










































































Note: S is the number of observations, Y is the number of observed wage cuts below the relevant limit
Table 3 displays the fraction of industry-years that are aﬀected by downward rigidity, cal-
culated as the incidence rate of notional wage changes that are below zero, –2 and –5 percent
respectively, multiplied by the fwcp evaluated at each threshold. We observe that 1.8 percent of
all industry year wage changes are pushed up above the –2 percent threshold, and this is higher
than for any of the other thresholds. This estimate is fairly stable across time periods, and the
geographical variation is also limited, ranging from 1.0 percent in the South to 2.4 percent in the
Anglo countries.
5.1 Expectational errors
To explore other possible explanations for our results, we pursue a number of alternative routes.
One possibility is that downward rigidity in reality is applying to expected real wages, and that
23expectational errors lead to additional ﬂexibility. To analyze this possibility, we have simulated
under the main procedure but using expected real wage changes, where the measure of expected
inﬂation is derived as country speciﬁc AR1 processes of actual inﬂation. The results are qualita-
tively similar, even though the estimated fwcp are somewhat smaller: 0.024, 0.066 and 0.165 at
levels zero, –2 and –5 respectively (results available at request). The tendency of weaker down-
ward rigidity for expected rather than actual real wages is the opposite of what one would expect
if expectational errors as regards inﬂation is a key cause of real wage ﬂexibility. Even if this
ﬁnding may also reﬂect that our estimate for the expected rate of inﬂation is noisy, it nevertheless
suggests that expectational errors is not important for real wage ﬂexibility.
5.2 Symmetric or asymmetric rigidity
We also do the analysis with an entirely diﬀerent identifying assumption, namely assuming sym-
metry within each country-year notional sample, following Card and Hyslop. Thus, rather than
using a common underlying distribution , we construct for each country-year sample the notional
distribution by replacing the observations below the median by the mirror image of the observa-
tions above the median. Note that this approach makes no assumptions across country years, in
contrast to the main approach, which makes no assumptions on symmetry. As these methods are
based on orthogonal assumptions, they constitute a strong test of the robustness of our results.
For example, our ﬁnding of drwr using our main approach might in principle be caused by inﬂa-
tion aﬀecting the shape of the wage change distribution apart from what is captured by location
and dispersion. However, unless such an eﬀect is asymmetric, it would not lead to a ﬁnding of
drwr using the symmetry method. As shown in Table F1 in the appendix, the estimated fwcp
are somewhat lower, but the results are qualitatively similar. This ﬁnding strengthens our belief
that our results are indeed caused by drwr.
Note that ﬁndings from the main approach should be interpreted as evidence of downward
rigidity, with no bearing on whether the rigidity is symmetric or asymmetric. In contrast, by the
symmetry method, we also ﬁnd evidence for the existence of asymmetric rigidity. The ﬁnding of
24Table 4: The fwcp at –2 percent by inﬂation intervals in percent.
 −∞,2  [2,4  [4,6  [6,8  [8,10  [10,∞ 
fwcp 0.155 0.179 0.234 0.072 0.168 0.052
No. of country-years 69 107 67 50 47 109
asymmetry is of independent interest, as it suggests that even if a shock is reversed, real wages
need not revert to their original level.
5.3 Real or nominal wage rigidity?
One possible alternative interpretation of our ﬁnding of drwr at −2 and −5 is that the missing
real wage cuts in fact are caused by downward nominal wage rigidity. We test for this possibility
by exploring whether there is any relationship between the fwcp and the rate of inﬂation. If our
ﬁndings of drwr are caused solely by dnwr, the fwcp will be zero for high rates of inﬂation,
and positive for low rates. However, while we see from Table 4 that the fwcp at the −2 percent
level is considerably higher when inﬂation is below two percent i.e. consistent with the downward
rigidity being caused by dnwr, than if inﬂation is above ten percent, the fwcp is even higher
for country-years where inﬂation rates are between four and six percent. Thus, if this deﬁcit of
real wage cuts is caused by downward nominal rigidity, there must be some downward nominal
rigidity at four percent nominal wage growth, and not only at constant nominal wages.
The idea that dnwr may in fact lead to increased nominal wages is consistent with ﬁndings by
Holden (1989) and Cramton and Tracy (1992). These papers point out that in a wage bargaining
where no strike takes place (often referred to as holdout), while at the same time the workers
inﬂict a cost on the ﬁrm by working less eﬃciently, the ﬁrm can be willing to raise nominal wages
to ensure an agreement with the workers. Cramton and Tracy (1992) obtain empirical support
for this idea on us wage contract data, and Holden (1989, 1998) do the same for wage setting in
the Nordic countries.
However, we also note that the fwcp is also high for inﬂation rates in the interval 8 to 10
percent, and even some above 10 percent inﬂation. This suggest that part of our ﬁnding of drwr
25is not caused by dnwr. Yet the overall negative relationship between the fwcp’s and the rate of
inﬂation clearly also indicates that dnwr does play a role.
6 The eﬀect of institutional and economic variables
A key question is to what extent the drwr we detect can be explained by diﬀerences in economic
and institutional variables. In Holden and Wulfsberg (2007), we ﬁnd that epl, union density
and unemployment are important determinants of dnwr. Table 5 reports results from Poisson
regressions for the same variables, with the number of real wage changes below −2 percent in a
country-year as the dependent variable. The ﬁrst two columns report results for the incidence of
real wage cuts (as we condition on the number of observations in the country-year), while the last
two columns report results for the fwcp (as we condition on the simulated number of real wage
cuts). Inﬂation is found to have a positive eﬀect on the incidence of real wage cuts. This is not
surprising, given that a positive inﬂation shock will reduce real wages.
Consistent with our ﬁndings above, inﬂation also has a negative impact on the fwcp. Note
that this is not caused by the same eﬀect as when inﬂation reduces the incidence of real wage
cuts. If positive inﬂation shock takes place, it will move the whole real wage change distribution,
and and as we condition on the mean real wage change, a positive inﬂation shock will not aﬀect
the fwcp unless there is a link between the inﬂation shock and the shape of the distribution of
the real wage changes. One possible cause of a link like that is if the drwr applies to expected
real wages, and is then eroded if a positive inﬂation shock takes place. However, our ﬁndings in
section 5.1 above does not support this interpretation. A more plausible interpretation, consistent
with our ﬁndings in section 5.3 above, is that under low inﬂation, downward rigidity of nominal
wages also contributes to drwr.
Unemployment has a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on the incidence of real wage cuts, and a neg-
ative eﬀect, although not signiﬁcant, on the fwcp. epl has the expected sign in all regressions
(negative eﬀect on the number of wage cuts), but only signiﬁcant in one of the pooled regressions.
Union density has the expected negative eﬀect on the number of wage cuts in three of the four
26Table 5: Maximum likelihood estimates with standard errors in parenthesis from negative binomial re-
gressions in columns one and two and from Poisson regressions in columns three and four. Signiﬁcant
estimates at 5% are indicated by an asterix.
Incidence of real wage cuts
below –2 percent
Fraction of real wage cuts
prevented below –2 percent
Pooled Fixed eﬀects Pooled Fixed eﬀects
Ln(Sit) 1 (–) 1 (–) – –








































log-likelihood –866.5 –747.2 –563.3 –563.9
Number of observations 422 422 392 392
regressions, and signiﬁcant in one of the ﬁxed eﬀect regressions. These results give some indi-
cation that drwr is aﬀected by labour market rigidity and unions, and that is it weakened by
unemployment. As in our work on dnwr, we also tried other institutional variables in this regres-
sion: bargaining coverage, temporary employment, and indices of centralisation and coordination.
However, these variables generally had even lower explanatory power than the variables that are
included in Table 5.
7 Conclusions
This paper explores whether real wages are rigid downwards, based on data for gross hourly earn-
ings for manual workers from the manufacturing, mining and quarrying, electricity, gas and water
supply, and construction sectors of 19 oecd countries in the period 1973–1999. Distinguishing
between groups of countries, we ﬁnd evidence of downward real wage rigidity drwr in the coun-
tries in the Core of Europe, and also some in the Anglo group, but no evidence of drwr in the
27Nordic and southern European countries. The extent of drwr is small. In the Core, the fwcp is
6 percent, implying that 6 percent of all notional real wage cuts are prevented by downward rigid-
ity. In the Anglo group, the fwcp is 3 percent. We ﬁnd stronger evidence of downward rigidity
at negative rates of change in the real wages, at −2 or −5 percent. In the Core, 19 percent of
all notional wage cuts below −2 percent is prevented by drwr, while in the Anglo and Nordic
countries, the fwcp at −2 is around 11–12 percent. At −5 percent, the fwcp is above 30 percent
in both the Core and the Nordic countries, 17 percent in the Anglo group, and 9 percent in the
South (the latter with p-value of 6 percent). There is, however, considerable heterogeneity within
the groups.
The higher fwcp at negative real wage changes is consistent with our theoretical model, where
workers’ resistance against a wage cut implies that drwr pushes up the wage even when the real
wage change is negative. Thus, even if small wage cuts are prevented by drwr, larger wage cuts
are made smaller by drwr, dampening the reduction in the number of small real wage cuts.
However, the greater fwcp for negative real wage changes than at zero may also reﬂect a negative
eﬀect on average wages from compositional changes, where old high-wage workers are replaced by
young low-wage workers, increasing the incidence of small negative changes in average wages.
Comparing downward rigidity of nominal and real wages, we ﬁnd that downward nominal
wage rigidity is much more signiﬁcant, and of greater magnitude, across regions and time periods,
although the diﬀerence in the late 1990s is much smaller than it is in earlier periods. However,
we also ﬁnd some drwr in high inﬂation periods, indicating that the drwr that we ﬁnd is an
independent phenomenon that is not only caused by dnwr combined with low rate of inﬂation.
In contrast to most previous studies of drwr, which consider wages of job stayers, we use
data for average wages at industry level. Thus, if drwr for job stayers is circumvented by ﬁrms
that give lower wage increases to other workers, or hire new workers at lower wages, it will not be
detected in our data. Nor will our data capture downward wage rigidity in some ﬁrms, if wages are
ﬂexible in other ﬁrms in the same industry, so that overall industry wages are ﬂexible. However,
in these cases it is questionable whether the wage rigidity at worker or ﬁrm level will have any
28impact at the aggregate level. In contrast, if the drwr prevails also at industry level, an eﬀect
on aggregate output and employment seems more likely.
Our ﬁnding of drwr is based on a univariate framework, including only data for real wage
growth. The univariate framework involves the advantage that no assumptions on explanatory
variables and functional forms are needed. Thus, when we detect drwr, we can be fairly conﬁdent
that this is indeed a feature of the data. On the other hand, by using a univariate framework, we
clearly cannot directly explore how wages respond to changes in variables like unemployment and
productivity. This would be an interesting extension of our work.
A further important extension of our work is to explore whether the wage rigidity we ﬁnd has
any eﬀects on other relevant economic variables. From a theoretical perspective, this is not clear.
Barro (1977) pointed out that short run real wage rigidity need not have any employment eﬀects,
as risk averse parties to a long term contract may avoid short run ﬂuctuations in real remuneration,
without letting it have any ineﬃcient allocative eﬀects. However, more recently Shimer (2005)
and Hall (2005) have argued that real wage rigidity with allocative eﬀects on vacancies and hirings
is crucial to explain vacancies and recruitment behaviour over the cycle. Furthermore, there is
fairly strong evidence that unemployment variation across time and oecd countries is related to
institutional labour market variables, like unemployment beneﬁts, union density and the degree
of coordination of wage setting, that is likely to reﬂect diﬀerences in wage setting behaviour (see
e.g. Nickell et al., 2003). Within this framework, one would expect increased wage pressure due
to binding downward real wage rigidity to induce lower employment and higher unemployment,
in line with the early explanations of the rise in European unemployment in the 1970s, cf e.g.
Grubb et al. (1983) and Bruno and Sachs (1985). To test this conjecture seems an important task
for future research. However, one should also bear in mind that we ﬁnd only a limited amount
of downward real wage rigidity, suggesting that the possible eﬀects on employment and output in
any case would be fairly small.
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A The Nash solution
The ﬁrst order condition for the Nash bargain requires that the left-hand derivative (i.e. w < w−1,










+ w1−η(1 + µ)wµw
−µ
−1 ≥ 0 (A1)




= (1 − η)w−η (w − V0) + w1−η ≤ 0 (A2)
Furthermore, we know that either w = w−1, or one of (A1) or (A2) hold with equality. In the
















The lower critical values for V0, V L
0 , is found by imposing w = w−1 in (A3), and then solving
for V0. As w− is strictly increasing in V0, it follows directly that w− < w−1 for V0 < V L
0 . It is
also straightforward to show that w+ < w−1 for V0 < V L
0 .
Correspondingly, V H
0 is found by imposing w = w−1 in (A4), and then solving for V0. As w+
is strictly increasing in V0, it follows directly that w+ > w−1 for V0 > V H
0 . Furthermore, it is
straightforward to show that w− > w−1 for V0 > V H
0 . Thirdly, it is straightforward to show that
in the interval V0 ∈ [V L
0 ,V H
0 ], we have w+ < w−1 < w−.
33It is then clear that for V0 < V L
0 , the Nash maximand is maximized by equality in (A1),
where w = w− < w−1. For V0 > V H
0 , the Nash maximand is maximized by equality in (A2) and
w = w+ > w−1. For V0 ∈ [V L
0 ,V H
0 ], the Nash maximand is maximized by w = w−1 ∈ [w+,w−],
where both (A1) and (A2) hold, with strict inequalities in the interior of the interval. QED
B Decomposing the change in industry wages
Consider a simple framework where we keep hours per worker constant, and where we assume
that hiring and separations occur between, and not within, years (relaxing these assumptions is
straightforward, but makes notation cumbersome and less transparent). Observe that the average
hourly wages in an industry in year t,wt, can be decomposed into the average wage of all job
stayers, ws
t, and that of all entrants, we
t, i.e. wt = ws
t(s/lt) + we
t(e/lt), where s + e = lt. (To
minimise possible confusing notation, we let s refer to the number of workers who stay from year
t − 1 to year t, without time subscript, and likewise for entrants in period t, e, and quitters
in period t − 1.) Correspondingly, the average wage in year t − 1 can be decomposed into the
average wage of workers who stay on year t, ws

















the growth in average wages is thus












































where the ﬁrst term is the wage increase for job stayers, while the term in the brackets is the
composition eﬀect, measured as the average wage in year t−1 of those who work in year t relative
to those who work in year t − 1. If the employment level is constant, lt = lt−1, and e = q, the




t−1)(q/lt), i.e. the wage growth for job stayers
times the ratio of stayers to total employment, plus the diﬀerence in wages for entrants relative
to quitters, times the quit rate.
C Data appendix
We have obtained wage data from Eurostat for all countries except Austria, Canada, Finland,
New Zealand Norway, Sweden and the us (see below). The precise source is Table hmwhour
in the Harmonized earnings domain of under the Population and Social Conditions theme in
the newcronos database. Our wage variable (hmwhour) is labelled Gross hourly earnings
34of manual workers in industry. Gross earnings cover remuneration in cash paid directly and
regularly by the employer at the time of each wage payment, before tax deductions and social
security contributions payable by wage earners and retained by the employer. Payments for leave,
public holidays, and other paid individual absences, are included in principle, in so far as the
corresponding days or hours are also taken into account to calculate earnings per unit of time.
The weekly hours of work are those in a normal week’s work (i.e. not including public holidays)
during the reference period (October or last quarter). These hours are calculated on the basis of
the number of hours paid, including overtime hours paid. Furthermore, we use data in national
currency and males and females are both included in the data. The data for Germany does not
include gdr before 1990 or new Länder.
The data are recorded by classiﬁcation of economic activities (nace Rev. 1). The sections
represented are Mining and quarrying (C), Manufacturing (D), Electricity, gas and water supply
(E) and Construction (F). We use data on various levels of aggregation from the section levels
(e.g. D Manufacturing) to group levels (e.g. DA 159 Manufacturing of beverages), however, using
the most disaggregate level available in order to maximize the number of observations. If for
example, wage data are available for D, DA 158 and DA 159, we use the latter two only to avoid
counting the same observations twice.
Wage data for Austria, Canada, Finland, New Zealand, Sweden and the us are from Table
5B ‘Wages in manufacturing’ in laborsta, the Labour Statistics Database, ilo. The data are
recorded by isic, Three digit level covering the same sectors as the Eurostat data. Wage data for
Norway are from Table 210 National Accounts 1970–2003, Statistics Norway, recorded by nace
Rev. 1. The sections represented are the same as for the Eurostat data.
The average number of observations per country-year sample is 20.5, with a standard error of
4.7. The distribution of the number of wage cuts relative to the number of observations on years
and countries are reported in Table C1.
We have removed ten extreme observations from the sample.
Data for inﬂation and unemployment are from the oecd Economic Outlook database.
The primary sources for the employment protection legislation (epl) index, which is displayed
in in Holden and Wulfsberg (2007, Table A.2), are oecd (2004) for the 1980–1999 period and
Lazear (1990) for the years before 1980. We follow the same procedure as Blanchard and Wolfers
(2000) to construct time-varying series which is to use the oecd summary measure in the ‘Late
1980s’ for 1980–89 and the ‘Late 1990s’ for 1995–99. For 1990-94 we interpolate the series. For
1973–79 the percentage change in Lazear’s index is used to back-cast the oecd measure. However,
we are not able to reconstruct the Blanchard and Wolfers data exactly.
Data for union density is from oecd. Data for Greece for 1978 and 1979 are interpolated
while data before 1977 is extrapolated at the 1977 level.






















1973 0/20 0/23 0/19 – 0/16 0/20 1/12 – 1/24 0/14 0/19 2/24 1/28 – – 1/21 8/20 14/260
1974 0/16 0/20 4/24 2/23 3/19 – 0/16 1/21 11/13 – 8/24 0/14 0/19 2/25 0/28 – – 1/21 19/20 51/303
1975 0/16 1/20 0/24 7/24 3/19 – 1/16 2/22 0/13 – 1/24 1/15 1/19 16/25 0/28 – – 5/21 8/18 46/304
1976 1/16 6/21 0/24 0/24 2/19 – 7/16 1/22 0/13 11/18 4/24 1/15 15/19 25/25 0/28 – – 22/23 /18 95/325
1977 1/16 1/21 1/24 1/24 14/19 – 12/16 1/22 0/13 6/18 2/24 7/15 0/19 15/25 0/28 – – 22/23 2/18 85/325
1978 0/16 3/21 23/24 0/24 5/19 – 8/16 1/22 0/13 1/18 1/24 8/15 2/20 2/25 4/28 – 4/26 1/23 4/18 67/352
1979 3/16 0/21 16/24 3/24 1/20 – 0/16 4/22 3/13 1/20 4/24 2/15 10/19 7/25 9/28 – 12/28 2/22 18/18 95/355
1980 4/16 1/21 9/24 0/24 20/20 – 5/16 3/22 4/13 15/19 15/24 3/15 15/19 23/25 18/28 – 14/28 11/22 17/18 177/354
1981 8/16 3/21 14/23 22/24 14/20 – 2/16 2/22 5/13 14/19 0/24 9/15 17/19 4/25 24/28 8/22 28/28 12/22 12/18 198/375
1982 5/16 18/21 11/20 19/24 11/20 – 4/16 5/21 0/13 15/20 10/24 13/16 3/18 9/25 13/28 8/22 27/28 6/22 4/18 181/372
1983 3/16 20/21 10/20 12/24 18/20 – 1/16 0/21 6/11 9/18 5/24 9/16 14/18 22/25 9/28 17/22 27/27 1/24 1/18 184/369
1984 12/16 21/21 6/28 15/27 18/20 – 0/16 21/22 1/17 6/18 21/24 10/16 15/16 27/25 1/28 21/22 1/27 2/24 13/18 211/385
1985 0/16 13/21 17/28 1/27 3/20 – 0/16 9/23 12/18 5/20 4/24 9/16 8/17 28/25 1/28 12/22 6/28 22/24 11/18 161/391
1986 0/16 15/21 19/28 0/27 8/20 – 0/16 5/23 18/18 2/21 – 0/14 2/18 3/25 2/28 3/22 1/28 2/24 7/18 87/367
1987 3/16 8/21 18/28 0/27 0/20 – 0/16 6/23 17/18 8/20 – 3/14 0/18 23/25 0/28 1/22 /28 /24 17/18 104/366
1988 1/16 6/21 18/28 0/27 3/20 – 0/16 14/23 1/18 3/20 – 3/14 3/18 7/25 21/28 8/21 1/28 1/25 17/18 107/367
1989 4/16 3/22 16/28 4/27 18/20 – 4/16 6/23 1/17 12/20 – 1/17 1/17 10/25 12/28 18/24 /28 6/26 19/20 135/371
1990 0/16 2/24 15/28 0/27 3/20 5/26 1/16 4/23 17/24 3/21 – 6/16 3/17 16/25 3/28 8/23 5/28 17/25 19/20 127/408
1991 1/16 2/24 18/28 1/27 3/20 1/26 5/16 4/23 17/25 8/21 – 3/16 7/17 9/25 0/28 6/23 – 5/25 18/20 108/380
1992 1/16 1/23 5/26 7/24 3/20 4/26 11/16 2/23 22/25 4/21 – 1/17 0/17 7/25 9/28 3/23 3/13 1/25 14/20 98/388
1993 8/16 4/22 11/26 15/24 4/20 7/26 7/16 12/24 16/25 2/21 – 3/17 4/14 17/25 4/28 8/23 14/14 12/25 17/20 165/386
1994 2/16 2/22 5/20 14/26 – 15/26 1/16 12/15 6/25 15/21 – 3/17 4/8 17/25 0/28 15/23 5/14 19/22 12/20 147/344
1995 1/16 21/22 13/20 0/26 – 9/26 0/16 1/10 9/25 12/20 – 5/17 0/10 17/25 2/28 10/23 2/14 4/21 13/20 119/339
1996 0/14 8/27 3/20 12/25 – 13/26 – 0/12 11/25 9/23 – 11/19 3/20 6/25 0/28 0/23 /14 3/26 7/20 86/347
1997 1/14 9/28 13/20 23/31 1/16 8/29 – 0/27 4/25 6/23 – 8/14 5/23 4/25 0/28 0/23 /15 10/27 5/18 97/386
1998 1/14 1/28 9/20 2/31 2/16 7/29 – 0/25 13/24 4/23 – 4/17 5/23 4/25 0/28 17/29 1/14 11/28 2/18 83/392
1999 0/14 – 15/20 – 4/16 12/30 – – – – – 2/17 21/22 6/25 0/22 – 1/14 – 3/18 64/198
Total 60/408 169/575 289/665 160/665 161/462 81/270 69/368 116/556 195/469 171/463 76/312 125/423 158/483 328/674 133/750 163/411 152/472 199/615 287/506 3092/9509
3
6Data for bargaining coverage is from oecd (2004, Table 3.5) which provide data for 1980, 1990
and 2000. Data for the intervening years are calculated by interpolation while the observations
for 1980 are extrapolated backwards. Data for Greece and Ireland is only available for 1994 from
ilo (1997, Table 1.2). This observation is extrapolated for the entire period.
The incidence of temporary employment is deﬁned as the fraction of temporary to total em-
ployment. Data from 1983 is from oecd’s Corporate Data Environment, Table Employment by
permanency of the (main) job. Data for Finland 1995 and 1996 and Norway are from Eurostat.
Data for Sweden are provided by the Statistics Sweden (scb). Lacking information prior to 1983,
we have chosen not to extrapolate the data.
D Combined regions and periods
Table D1: The fraction of real wage cuts prevented (FWCP) estimated at 0, –2 and –5 percent and the
fraction of nominal wage cuts prevented. See Table 1 for notes.
Evaluation criteria
#∆w < 0 #∆w < −0.02 #∆w < −0.05 #(∆w + π) < 0
Region Period S Y FWCP Y FWCP Y FWCP Y FWCP

































































































































As a further exploration of the robustness of our results, we perform an extensive sensitivity
analysis of our main approach, by varying the key assumptions. More speciﬁcally, we try diﬀerent
assumptions along three dimensions of the underlying notional distribution, namely the shape,
the location and the dispersion. As to the shape of the underlying distribution, in addition to the
common distribution, we also try country-speciﬁc and period-speciﬁc distribution. Speciﬁcally,
we construct the underlying notional distribution separately for each country (period), based on
all observations from this country (period), and then proceed with the method as before. For
the location of the distribution, we follow Knoppik and Beissinger (2003) by also trying the 80th
percentile, with the motivation that in some country-years, the median wage change is potentially
aﬀected by drwr, while this is rarely the case for the 80th percentile. For the dispersion of the
distribution, we consider two alternatives to the inter percentile range. As the 35th percentile
potentially quite often is aﬀected by drwr, we also consider an alternative that does not rely on
any speciﬁc percentile, namely the mean deviation from the mean, mdev. However, if drwr is
at work, it will compress the left part of the distribution and thus reduce both these measures of
dispersion, involving a downward bias in our measure of downward rigidity. To avoid this, we also
measure dispersion by the predicted inter percentile range, found in country-speciﬁc regressions of
the actual inter percentile ranges on the lagged inter percentile range, inﬂation, the average inter
percentile range in other countries in the same region, a trend and a squared trend. Note that
several of these alternative measures are likely to involve considerably more random noise than
the main measures (mdev and the 80th percentile are sensitive to outliers, while the predicted ipr
is sensitive to prediction error). Thus, we would expect considerable variation in the estimated
fwcp. However, trying such diverse sets of measures nevertheless provide information about the
robustness of the broad picture. All together, to construct the notional distributions we use 18
diﬀerent combinations of three distributional shapes (common, country-speciﬁc, period-speciﬁc) ×
two measures of location (median or 80th percentile) × three dispersions (ipr, mdev or predicted
ipr).
Figure E1 presents measures of the 18 estimates of the fwcp for each of the limits 0, –1,
–2, –5 and −π percent (i.e. nominal zero). The estimates from Table 1 is indicated with a dot,
a cross indicates an estimate that is signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level, while the plus signs
are fwcp estimates that are not signiﬁcant. The number above the estimates is the number of
signiﬁcant estimates. We observe that while there is considerable variation in the estimates, the
main features from the Table 1 still hold. There is clear evidence of drwr at –2 and –5 percent
growth rates, where almost all the fwcp estimates are signiﬁcant. There is some evidence of











































































Figure E1: Estimates of the fraction of real wage cuts prevented evaluated at 0, –1, –2 and –5 percent,
and the fraction of nominal wage cuts prevented. There are 18 estimates per evaluation criteria. A cross
indicates a signiﬁcant estimate at 5 percent while a plus sign indicates an insigniﬁcant estimate. The
number of signiﬁcant estimates reports are reported on top of each column.
fewer are signiﬁcantly larger than zero. The evidence of dnwr is stronger than the evidence of
drwr, with higher fwcp estimates, where all are signiﬁcant. In Figure E1, we also display similar
charts for time periods and regions. There is considerable variation, yet the broad picture is not
aﬀected.
39F Symmetric notional distributions
Table F1: The fraction of real wage cuts prevented (FWCP) estimated at 0, –2 and –5 percent and the
fraction of nominal wage cuts prevented. Symmetric and country-year speciﬁc notional distributions. p-
values in parenthesis.
Evaluation criteria
#∆w < 0 #∆w < −0.02 #∆w < −0.05 #(∆w − π) < 0
Category S Y FWCP Y FWCP Y FWCP Y FWCP










































































Note: S is the number of observations, Y is the number of observed wage cuts below the relevant limit
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